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TRUTH, RAMSIFICATION, AND THE
PLURALIST’S REVENGE
Cory D. Wright
Functionalists about truth employ Ramsification to produce an implicit
definition of the theoretical term true, but doing so requires determining that
the theory introducing that term is itself true. A variety of putative dissolutions
to this problem of epistemic circularity are shown to be unsatisfactory. One
solution is offered on functionalists’ behalf, though it has the upshot that they
must tread on their anti-pluralist commitments.
1. Introduction
Truth-theorists are sometimes asked what a theory of truth is about. In
answering ‘truth’, we go around in a very small circle. A less loopy answer
might instead begin with a little more philosophical spadework. For
instance, we might try to gainfully reinterpret the question as a question
about how the terms used to talk about truth—such as truth or true—are to
be defined.1 After all, for any given theory of truth T , such terms are
theoretical terms; and questions about how to define theoretical terms have
well-known answers.
Inflationists often take this route, claiming that true attributes a property
which consists in being F. Functionalism about truth is one such inflationary
theory, although its central thesis is the further claim that being F is a
functional kind rather than a structural one.2 More specifically,
(fnct) true refers to the single higher-order functional role property F of
having lower-order properties r1, . . . , rn that realize it.
To arrive at this thesis, functionalists suppose that true can be defined
implicitly via the quasi-formal technique of Ramsification.
1Given that philosophers of language don’t have a consistent and unified theoretical vocabulary for
discussing semantic, semiotic, and alethic relations (reference, deixis, signification, designation, predication,
denotation, profiling, satisfaction, etc.), I’ll generally use terms for reference as the most neutral genus-level
family of terms allowing us to bypass thorny questions about which are the most grammatically appropriate
to invoke and when. In certain contexts, attribution—although clearly not synonymous with terms for
reference—will be preferable.
2Functionalism about truth, which sometimes goes by the misnomer alethic functionalism, has been
developed primarily by Lynch [2000, 2004, 2005, 2009]. The theory was anticipated by Lafleur [1941], to a
limited extent, and again in a more recognizable form by Pettit [1996]. For additional exposition, see Devlin
[2003], Wright [2005], and Sher [2005].
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My contention is that theories of truth employing Ramsification face a
problem of epistemic circularity. The problem arises because any such
implicit definition proceeds, at least in part, on the basis of explicit
decisions that certain sentences containing the definiendum are themselves
true. Rather than simply dispensing with Ramsification itself [cf. Lynch
2009], I propose nine putative dissolutions to the problem. After
explaining why each fails, I offer a positive solution on behalf of
functionalists. The solution, however, requires of functionalists that they
slough off certain monistic assumptions. Since both the problem and the
solution generalize to any theory of truth relying on Ramsification to
define the theoretical terms used to talk about truth, pluralism becomes a
pressing issue. I leave it as an open question whether pluralists have a
viable position themselves.
2. Why Implicit Definition?
Perhaps the most straightforward way to define theoretical terms is simply
to provide explicit and noncircular definitions of the form
defnð Þ x : . . . x . . . ¼df $$$$$;
where ‘. . . x . . .’ is some definiendum involving the unique term being defined,
‘¼df’ is the relation of definitional equation, and ‘––––’ is the definiens in
terms of which x is explicitly defined but doesn’t occur.
Theoretical terms often resist explicit and noncircular definitions,
however. Indeed, scientific theories are renowned for occasioning terms
that have technical or specialized senses, or express unfamiliar or exotic
conceptualizations, or stand for unobservable posits or abstracta of
questionable repute: e.g., caloric, dark matter, or superstring in
physical theory, fitness or race in biology, and sense-datum, id, or
intelligence in the psychological sciences. Call these recalcitrant terms the
t-terms of a scientific theory T . A t-term-introducing theory T needn’t be
exclusively scientific, however. Many of our more interesting philosophical
concepts are those whose expression—e.g., causation, representation,
person, and well-being—has also proven resistant to explicit noncircular
definition.
The reasons for resistance vary widely. Often, they are purpose-relative.
Those t-terms introduced stipulatively, for example, can simply fail to
achieve their intended aim; those introduced descriptively may under-
estimate the wide variety of actual usages; those introduced ampliatively can
fail to constitute a sufficient theoretical improvement; and so forth. In other
cases, the reasons for resistance are term-specific. For example, slingshot
arguments await those correspondence theorists attempting to define truth
in terms of a structural relation of correspondence between truth-bearers
and facts. For a term like coherence, the difficulty is due to a certain lack of
mathematical precision among comparative approaches to the analysis of
COHERENCE [Millgram 2000: 82–3].
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In still other cases, attempts at explicit non-circular definition are further
encumbered because the t-term targeted for definition has quotidian
counterparts that enjoy common and versatile usage in ordinary discourse.
Such cases seemingly induce a feeling of trying to define something that is
paradoxically strange but familiar, profound yet mundane [Lynch 2005: 29;
Næss 1938: 159–60]. One observes this in even the earliest and most
elementary of the Platonic dialogues—Socrates’s attempt to formulate
ampliative definitions of friendship in the Lysis, for example. And as the
number of distinct counterparts increases, the encumbrance is further
compounded. The difficulty in explicitly defining the t-term sentence in
linguistic theory, for example, is due not so much to its merely having
additional senses, but to its having hundreds of them [Ries 1931].
In the case of truth, Davidson [1996] urged that the appropriate
response is to quit: attempts to give any kind of general definition are
unwittingly involved in folly simply because the term truth—as he took
Tarski to have shown—is indefinable. For some, Davidson’s brand of
primitivism seems unduly pessimistic. An alternative strategy for managing
difficulties incurred from attempts at explicit and noncircular definitions of
t-terms is simply to offer implicit definitions instead. Rather than equating
a definiendum with some definiens, implicit definitions take the form of
certain true sentences sj, sk, . . . that are constitutive of T and in which the
definiendum occurs. For example, t-terms like point, line, and radius, which
occur in the axioms of Euclidian geometry, are commonly said to be
implicitly defined by those axioms. The assumption underlying this
strategy is that, in reckoning that T is true, one assigns, implicitly, its t-
terms the meanings they would need to have in order for T to be true.
Accordingly, it’s sufficient for determining what a t-term means that the
theorist determine some, perhaps even many, of the true sentences in
which it features as a subsentential component.
The strategy of implicit definition forms the basis for the quasi-formal
technique of Ramsification, which has long been offered as a way to define
t-terms by exchanging them—purportedly without loss of meaning—for a
‘street-level’ vocabulary. Since the meanings of those t-terms weren’t well
understood in the first place, then quantifying over the variables that replace
them stands to produce a definitive sentence serving as a descriptively
adequate substituend for the original theory.
3. Defining Alethic Terms Implicitly
3.1 Ramsification
The standard version of Ramsification is the one popularized by Lewis
[1970],3 which begins by amassing whatever principles Pj, Pk, . . . are
constitutive of the postulate of T or otherwise relevant to its introduction
3Modifications and alternatives to Lewis’s version abound; see, e.g., Craig [1953], Martin [1966], Bohnert
[1967], Bedard [1993], Hawthorne [1994], and Horwich [1997]. None of them circumvents the problem of
epistemic circularity discussed herein.
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of the target t-term.4 Having fixed upon this set of principles, the second
step is to order and then conjoin them to form a single sentence which is
materially equivalent to (T : P1, . . . , Pn). Lewis had us rewrite the result as
Tð Þ R t1; . . . ; tn; o1; . . . ; onð Þ;
so as to isolate the t-terms targeted for implicit definition. (For the purpose
of homogenizing the variables that will appear in forthcoming derivations,
Lewis also proposed that we convert all functors and predicative t-terms
in the postulate of T to their corresponding nominalizations, i.e.,
t-name1, . . . , t-namen.)
Any such implicit definition necessitates a large register of additional
terms, against which the meaning and use of t-terms can be situated. After
all, the string t-name1, . . . , t-namen would be quite useless otherwise—
nearly incomprehensible, practically incommunicable, and certainly un-
grammatical. The remainder of R therefore consists in what Lewis called
old-or-original-or-other terms. Unfortunately, Lewis said little else about
how to characterize these o-terms, though the very idea of an o-term is
perhaps sufficiently intuitive. If need be, we can precisify it as follows. Let an
expression x be an o-term in a given language L iff x is a symbolic structure
Si with unit status in the grammar of L prior to the formulation of T , where
[Si] exhaustively consists in a phonological unit [p] that (literally) calls to
mind a semantic unit [s] for speakers of L (i.e. [[s]–[p]]). An o-sentence is then
any sentence of L free of t-terms.
The next step is to replace every t-name instance with a corresponding
subscripted variable (x1, . . . , xn) ranging over individuals in the domain of
R. In the case at hand, all terms pertaining to truth, truths, truth-talk,
judgments-of-truth, etc. are stripped out, as well as terms that are
potentially interdefinable with them—assert, real, fact, etc. Doing so results
in an open sentence,
T 0ð Þ R x1; . . . ; xn; o1; . . . ; onð Þ;
which Lewis called the realization formula of T . Basically, T 0 is
a specification of what must obtain for the postulate of T to be
4Lewis allowed for the postulate of T to be of arbitrary length—anything from a single sentence to a
decidably infinite set of sentences. As we shall see, its content must be anything but arbitrary, which
immediately raises a thorny question about which principles to amass [Wright 2005]. Wright [2001: 759]
claimed that anything ‘chiming with’ ordinary a priori platitudes should be initially counted, followed by
later scrutinization. Although this response ignores what’s interesting about the question, Wright was correct
in presupposing that the technique generally works on a ‘more-the-merrier’ basis (in so far as obtaining more
information facilitates the identification of candidate denotata). And yet, too much merriment can result in
an output that is ‘inconvenient’, as Lewis put it, and possibly even counterproductive. Subsequently,
enthusiasts of Ramsification commonly distinguish some privileged or essential subset of principles, which
demarcates minimal competence with the concept expressed by the t-term, from the full amassed collection,
which characterizes the conceptual content of T in its entirety [Lynch 2009: 13–16 ff]. There is a serious
problem, however, with settling on the appropriate criteria for inclusion and exclusion [Wright 2005]. Since
this so-called criteria problem is likely to remain unsettled for a while, let us momentarily bracket it and
assume—with functionalists and other enthusiasts—that there is some extant procedure for fixing upon some
subset of the essential or privileged principles, or at least some criteria for extracting and distilling them.
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realized—i.e., a ‘job description’ as it’s sometimes put. And the postulate of
T is realized just in case T 0 is satisfied by any ordered n-tuple of entities—
i.e., some realizer ri that plays the role or does the job identified and
individuated by T 0. It is uniquely realized just in case exactly one ordered n-
tuple satisfies T 0, multiply realized if more than one does, and unrealized if
none does. Whether a theory is unrealized, uniquely realized, or multiply
realized depends on what there is.
Articulating the sentence stating that T is so realized—namely, its Ramsey
sentence T 0R—is achieved by prefixing, for each subscripted variable xi2R,
an existential quantifier binding it.
ðT 0RÞ 9x1; . . . ; 9xn½Rðx1; . . . ; xn; o1; . . . ; onÞ&:
The Ramsey sentence simply specifies that there exists some such realizer ri.
And the point of doing so, of course, is to position the theorist to be able to
make the same ontic commitments that would otherwise be incurred by
asserting or endorsing T .5
3.2 Application to Theories of Truth
From T 0R, the conditions under which some ri is possessed can then be given
by embedding the Ramsey sentence in the requisite biconditional,
ðT LÞ riðaÞ ' 9x1; . . . ; 9xn ½Rðx1; . . . ; xn; o1; . . . ; onÞ & a has x1; . . . ; xn&:
T L states that an individual a has some ri denoted by the (nominalized)
t-term when and only when the variable xi replacing it both is R-related to
certain other terms in the postulate of T and is had by a. For functionalists
about truth, the individual is some truth-bearer s and the corresponding
biconditional states that s has some alethic property ri that realizes the
F-role just in case the extant value of the variable xi replacing truth is both
t-named by the terms of the theory en masse and is had by s:
ðT 0LÞ s has some alethic property ri realizing F
' 9x1; . . . ; 9xn½Rðx1; . . . xn; o1 . . . onÞ & s has x1; . . . ; xn&
5Of course, the derivation from T to T 0R yields a less informative and more abstract sentence (roughly, in the
same sense that the sentence there is at least one truth logically entails the less informative and more abstract
sentence there is at least one entity). Yet, as Ramsey famously noted, the magnitude of T 0R is no less powerful,
given that it makes all the same predictions and inferential connections between observation sentences.
Furthermore, as Bohnert [1967] less famously noted, the flight from informativeness is kept at a minimum.
For instance, logically equivalent sentences, such as the conjunction of shorter conjunctions,
ðT 00RÞ 9x1½Rðx1; o1; . . . ; onÞ&;& . . . ;& 9xn½Rðxn; o1; . . . ; onÞ&;
are not necessarily as expressively powerful as T 0R; for t-names may irrigidly denote where various realization
formulae fall within the scope of different quantifiers. In the case of pluralism about truth, irrigid denotation
might be something comfortably accommodated or tolerable.
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From T 0L, functionalists can then make explicit the conditions under which
s is true:
ðT 00LÞ s is true ' s has some alethic property ri realizing F :
Yet, as Lynch [2004, 2005] rightly noted, neither T 0L nor T
00
L entails a
commitment about the ‘deep’ metaphysical nature of truth itself; these
biconditionals only specify necessary and sufficient conditions. Given the
choice, functionalists identify truth with the F-role itself—not with whatever
ordered n-tuples happen to realize the property of being the F-role for a
given sector of (truth-apt) discourse [Pettit 1996: 886]. More specifically,
ðT 000L Þ true: s is true
¼df s has the property of having some realizer ri of the F-role:
Subsequently, the inferential route to the central thesis of functionalism
about truth should be clearer. To say that the t-name truth denotes a
functional kind F is to say that truth is the property of having a property
that plays the F-role.
In turn, it should also be clearer why functionalism about truth proves
to be a kind of inflationary theory to rival all others, including the
correspondence theory. T 000L entails (although is not entailed by) the
inflationist claim that true refers to F and is explicitly and non-circularly
definable in terms of it,
ðinflÞ true: s is true ¼df s is F ;
given only the assumption that properties consisting in being F just are, or
are reducible to, F.
3.3 Monism versus Pluralism
The choice of identifying truth with the F-role in lieu of its realizers allows
functionalists to bypass several problems thought to beset monistic and
pluralistic theories. On one hand, monists claiming that ‘truth is one’ take
the nature of truth to be uniform across all (truth-apt) sectors of discourse;
yet, some candidate properties and relations are intuitively plausible for
some sectors, but far less so in others. This is the so-called scope problem.6
For example, a monistic theory proposing that the truth of all true
sentences in cartographical discourse consists in being structurally
homomorphic may be correct, fecund, provide elegant explanations, and
so forth. Yet, homomorphism is less intuitively plausible as a candidate for
what truth consists in for true sentences in mathematics, comedy,
6For further discussion of the scope problem, see Sher [1998, 2004] and Lynch [2004]. For discussion of the
problems faced by pluralists about truth, including equivocation, generalization, and mixed inference, see,
e.g., Lynch [2000, 2004], Wright [2005], Sher [2005], and Pedersen [2006].
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aesthetics and gastronomics, ethics, and a variety of other sectors of
discourse.
On the other hand, consider pluralists who claim that ‘truth is many’. For
instance, one might identify the ‘‘‘deep’’ metaphysical nature of truth itself’
with the lower-order realizers r1, r2, and r3 (e.g., accuracy, super-
assertibility, and coherence) of F in different discourse sectors. Yet claims
that truth denotes not one thing but many putatively face problems of
equivocation, generalization, and mixed inference owing to their prolifera-
tion of truth properties.7 For example, if the truth of psychological and
moral sentences consist in different properties, then the inference from the
premises Joe Louis is vain and vanity is a moral deficit to the conclusion Joe
Louis has a moral deficit may fail to be a valid inference if no single uniform
property of truth is being preserved.
Functionalism about truth attempts to circumvent these one–many
problems. By its central thesis fnct, there is a single higher-order functional
role property F of having many lower-order properties r1, . . . , rn that
realize it.8 Subsequently, functionalists take us a great distance in showing
how we might try to accommodate both pluralist and monist views about
truth while avoiding the problems of each. T 000L still allows for the possibility
that F itself is multiply realized—i.e., what Devlin [2003: 59] correctly calls
polyalethism—in so far as what realizes the higher-order role property Fmay
differ across sectors of discourse. But it precludes the possibility that the
postulate of T is multiply realized, since the F-role is the single, unique
property denoted by the singular t-name targeted for analysis. And
Ramsification is the lynchpin in all of this.
4. Realization and Epistemic Circularity
Advocates of Ramsification often follow Lewis in supposing that T is
defective if T 0 is unrealized or multiply realized. The sense of defective, here,
is the sense in which the theory attempts to introduce a theoretical term to
name something specific, but nothing is so named in the former case (i.e., the
definiendum has Ø as its extension) and the thing named in the latter case is
we know not what (i.e., the definiendum suffers from referential indetermi-
nacy).9 Consequently, only in cases of unique realization—whereby the
7Some of these ‘problems’ arise from a faulty characterization of the nature of semantic and conceptual
ambiguity, and so are easily dissolved.
8The motivation to employ the functionalist apparatus of roles and realizers in the first place would be far
less persuasive if the set of realizers turned out to be a set of cardinality one.
9Pace Lewis [1970: 432–3], the specific type of theoretical defect is falsity. Lewis’s claim is fairly
straightforward in cases where T is unrealized. The t-names miasma and phlogiston, for example, are
introduced by the theories of miasmatic transmission and phlogistification under the assumption that the
existential quantifier binding each xi2R implies existence; but we count those theories as being false since
they imply the existence of non-extant entities. Likewise, if T is some version of monism or pluralism about
truth and no ordered n-tuple of entities satisfies their respective realization formulae, then the sentence there’s
either one or many ways of being true is false. Cases of T being multiply realized are far less straightforward.
We can certainly concur that multiple realization is less desirable than unique realization, since being unable
to non-arbitrarily (re-)identify the ith entity of the ordered n-tuple of the realization by the ith term of T 0 is
surely a defect. But it’s unclear why that defect is one of falsity. As Bedard [1993: 506] notes, extreme
complexity and weakness—like multiple realization—is unattractive; yet, we don’t count T as false simply
because it’s not simple or strong enough. In any case, given that functionalism is a version of monism about
truth (there is but one F-role per T 000L ; see [Wright 2005: 13–15]), let us momentarily bracket these
complications.
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elements of the ordered n-tuple are the precisely the ones t-named by their
corresponding terms in R—can the initial postulate of T can be fully
recovered from the Ramsey sentence in conjunction with the Carnap
sentence,
ðT CÞ 9x1; . . . ; 9xnðx1; . . . ;xn; o1; . . . ; onÞ ( Rðt1; . . . ; tn; o1; . . . ; onÞ:
Unique realization is thus the standard of correctness we should insist on,
unless it turns out to be a standard too stringent to meet—that was Lewis’s
insight.
For any given T , determining whether that standard is met requires
determining, a fortiori, that the antecedent of the Carnap sentence with
uniqueness,
ðT 0!CÞ ð9!y1; . . . ; 9!ynÞð8x1; . . . ; 8xnÞ½Rðx1; . . . ; xn; o1; . . . ; onÞ
' ðy1 ¼ x1 & . . . & yn ¼ xnÞ& ( Rðt1; . . . ; tn; o1; . . . ; onÞ;
holds. (For our purposes, we can read T !C as stating that, if there exists a
single unique n-tuple satisfying the functionally specified profile, then the
theory t-names it.)
In turn, determining that the antecedent holds involves determining,
inter alia, the truth-values of all conjuncts of R. After all, recall that one
of the first steps in producing the Ramsey sentence is that the postulate
of T be rewritten as a materially equivalent conjunction R. Assuming
classical logic, T will be false if any given conjunct of R is false. Where
T is false, so too will be the realization formula T 0, the Ramsey sentence
T 0R, and the Carnap sentence with uniqueness T !C derived from it. And
where any of these is false, we have good reason to think that the
definiendum fails to denote. With Ramsification, what you put in is what you
get out.
And so it’s here that the problem of epistemic circularity rears.
Functionalists about truth implicitly define their (nominalized) t-term true
by using Ramsification to produce a sentence that indicates its denotation.
But any implicit definition proceeds on the basis of explicit decisions that
the principles constitutive of T are themselves true. Hence the circularity.
In turn, making any explicit decisions that they are true requires already
knowing in advance what truth is. Hence the epistemic circularity. If we
suppose further that knowing in advance what truth is entails knowing
what the t-name truth denotes, then it becomes unclear why functionalists
about truth ever required an implicit definition via Ramsification in the
first place. Hence the problem. Moreover, we might add, failure to
determine the truth-values of the conjuncts of R would position the
theorist to be unable to ascertain whether the implicit definition can be
maintained for any and all permutations of (T : P1, . . . , Pn) or other intra-
theoretic refinements.
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5. Putative Dissolutions
It’s surely no consolation to functionalists that the problem of epistemic
circularity generalizes to any theory of truth invoking Ramsification to
implicitly define true. Interestingly though, the problem is not a fatal one—
either for the functionalist or any other truth-theorist. Before providing one
solution, however, let me briefly canvass nine ways one might attempt to
dissolve the problem, each of which is deemed unsatisfactory.
First, one might argue that there’s no problem because theorists needn’t
do anything beyond observing that the Ramsified t-terms of a true theory
are implicitly defined by its axioms. This putative dissolution misses the
mark, and widely. Yes, the terms are so defined; but any truth-theorist
resting their analysis on such an observation is one whose ‘employment’ of
the technique is little more than a gratuitous logical drill. Truth-theorists
employ Ramsification because they are interested in advancing their
theories, not because they are interested in giving an exposition of the
methods they could possibly use to do so. At the very least, functionalists
about truth can hardly be accused of such diffidence. They employ
Ramsification to show that the t-name truth they introduce denotes what
they say it does, not to show that one might hypothetically define it as such
were there to eventually be a true theory about truth.
Second, one might argue that truth-theorists need not determine the
truth-values of the conjuncts of R. Instead, they need only endorse or assert
T , plus any of the derivations produced as the output of Ramsifying over it.
The problem with this putative dissolution is the insufficiency of all such
asseveration; for mere endorsements or assertions of a theory, however
vehement, are no guarantee against the possibility of its falsity. And
theorists endorsing or asserting a false theory are theorists who fail to
implicitly define a target t-term via Ramsification.
Consequently, it won’t do to argue that the problem of epistemic
circularity dissolves once we distinguish the requirement (i) that all
conjuncts of R must be true from the requirement (ii) that all conjuncts
must be determined to be true.10 The distinction, while clear, fails to do the
work demanded of it. It’s tantamount to claiming that the target t-term will
be implicitly defined by merely articulating the constituent principles of T ,
as long as requirement (i)—but not necessarily (ii)—is satisfied. Now
plainly, the material point isn’t about the articulation of T , for the simple
reason that if neither endorsement nor assertion is sufficient to ensure that
the postulate of T is true, then certainly nothing weaker will do. Rather,
what’s at issue is precisely whether or not requirement (i) is satisfied given
some articulation of T , not whether all conjuncts of R must be true for the
technique to work—that much was already acknowledged. And any such
answer or decision that it is satisfied will involve, a fortiori, determining the
truth-values of the conjuncts of R. Again, this isn’t to deny that the
distinction is a legitimate and important one to make; rather, the point is
10Thanks to a referee for prompting closer scrutiny of this distinction.
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that making it fails to provide functionalists and other enthusiasts of
Ramsification with the intended dissolution.
But third, don’t both of these responses fail to abide by basic principles of
charity? Surely the theorist marshalling T will assume that the conjuncts of
R are indeed true and that there is indeed something so denoted; in kind, we
should assume that she (literally) knows what she is theorizing about, in so
far as she is an expert on the domain thereof. Fine, but goodwill must not
cede to bad faith; for these are precisely the assumptions upon which the
success of theorists’ implicit definitions turn, and nothing but question-
begging is accomplished by mere stipulation or further meta-assumptions
about the theorist’s assumptions. We equip ourselves with standards such as
truth, not as some sort of theoretical hood ornament, but in order to test
whether they’re met; and we do so test precisely to avoid just these kinds of
avoidance tactics.
Fourth, one might take issue with the charge of question-begging,
arguing that it actually goes the other way around: locutions like
‘determining that all conjuncts of R are indeed true’ are simply paraphrases
of locutions that invoke verification, and it’s this verification requirement
that foists the problem onto functionalists—not the technique of
Ramsification itself. In response, it’s hardly clear why determination-
locutions need be explicated in terms of verification, much less why they
need to be explicated at all: in the context of theories of truth, such
locutions will just be o-terms. But even if such explication were necessary,
this putative dissolution is only worth taking seriously to the extent that the
counter-charge of question-begging is warranted. But what, exactly, has
been begged? That Ramsification involves analysing the postulate of T as a
true conjunction R? That we count implicit definitions of some t-term as
successful to the extent we can introduce them in the context of what we
know to be true? That verification is a truth-tracking procedure? Surely not
the non sequitur that building a verification requirement into Ramsification
entails verificationism about truth. Since the reasons for thinking that truth
is a standard against which we should test our theoretical principles, it
stands to reason that the effect of paraphrasing determination-locutions as
verification doesn’t so much undermine the problem of epistemic circularity
as amplify it.
Fifth, suppose we instead concede that the credibility of T does ride on
evaluating the conjuncts of R, and that the provision of such evaluation is
indeed given by testing for certain standards. Still, one might argue that
these requirements are trivially satisfied precisely because the postulate of T
was always postulated to be an ideal theory. There is no better response to
such a claim than Russell’s: ‘the method of ‘‘postulating’’ what one wants
has many advantages; they are the same as the advantages of theft over
honest toil’ [1919: 71]. What does ‘ideal theory’ refer to if not just a theory
that is, minimally, true of the phenomena within its scope? And if there is
some conception of truth tacit in the conception of an ideal theory, then the
extent to which it must be paraphrased away is the extent to which the
aforementioned requirement (ii) cannot be satisfied trivially. Hence, we
should wonder whether the stipulation is even efficacious to begin with.
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The objector could instead follow Lewis, who declared, ‘Suppose the best
scientific explanation we can devise [. . .] includes T ’ [1970: 428].
Unfortunately, this leaves open the possibility that our ‘best explanation’
is the best of a bad lot, not to mention that ‘best’, like ‘ideal’, would need to
be explicated in a way that does not just further conceal some conception of
truth.
Alternatively, one might take the concession in an opposing direction,
arguing that the requirement (ii) can be read merely as a requirement to
determine whether some standard weaker than truth is met. For example,
it’s plain that the input over which theorists Ramsify should adequately
describe whatever it purports to be about; hence, one might argue that
functionalists need only determine that conjuncts of R meet this standard—
what Hempel called descriptive adequacy—not truth. Perhaps there’s
something to this dissolution, though some clarification would still need
to be given as to how descriptive adequacy isn’t just tantamount to truth
here (as Hempel thought), as well as why weaker standards like
being adequate will suffice when stronger ones like truth and idealization
will not.
Seventh (and relatedly) one might again concede that functionalists face
a problem of circularity, but argue that the circularity is semantic, not
epistemic; for it concerns what functionalists must be able to conceive of
or understand in order to know that T is true, not what they must know.11
Of course, this is not to say that semantic circularity is desirable. As David
[2002: 164] rightly put the point, only an empty definition would result
from invoking all the facts about alethic, semantic, and pragmatic
phenomena, including the facts that involve phenomena related to truth;
for any implicit definition of true succeeds when explicitly based on the
facts involving truth. However—and here’s the twist—the elimination of
semantic circularity from the definiens is already built into the technique of
Ramsification.12
There’s little reason to think that the epistemic circularity must be
redefined semantically, which is reason enough to think that this seventh
attempt at dissolution will ultimately be unsuccessful. The objector
supposes that functionalists won’t be able to detect whether, e.g., it’s true
that true sentences have false negations unless they already understand the
meaning of true (or assertion, falsity, negation, etc.). Perhaps, but
understanding the meaning of true won’t suffice for ensuring that the
implicit definition is successful since it won’t suffice for ensuring that
falsehoods aren’t erroneously screened into the conjunction R. What is
required is that theorists know actual truth-values, not comprehend
11Thanks to a referee for raising this clever objection.
12Functionalists need not—and don’t appear to—Ramsify over meaning postulates of the form x means y or
explicit definitions (recall, for instance, that they arrive at T 000L as a result of Ramsification, not prior to it).
But they certainly could, and certainly should if moved to make intra-theoretical refinements over time.
Suppose that functionalists engage in successive iterations of Ramsification over T (i.e., Ramsification over
T on the first iteration, over T ’s successor T 0 0 on the second, over T 0 0’s successor T 0 0 0 0 on the third, etc.).
Then we should expect that any claims about truth derived from T on the 1st iteration, such as T 000L , would be
acceptable for invoking in successive iterations of Ramsification over any successors of T , and that failure to
explicitly affirm the claims arrived at when articulating T 0 0, T 0 0 0 0, etc. would justify doubt about the truth of
the initial theory T .
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possible meanings. Further, given that some principles of T may be
non-analytic or a posteriori, as functionalists themselves aver, merely
understanding what true means will not settle whether they’re true: the
world itself must cooperate. Further still, whether it’s true that, e.g., truth
is correspondence to the facts and not identity to the facts, or vice versa,
or neither, is not settled by simply accessing a lexical entry for true or
having some minimal concept TRUTH. Hence, with the objector, we can
agree that needing to possess the concept TRUTH, or understand the
meaning of true, in order to produce a theoretical definition would be a
kind of conceptual, or semantic, circularity distinct from the kind of
epistemic circularity involved in having to know that the conjuncts of R
are true. Nevertheless, determining that the antecedent of the Carnap
sentence with uniqueness holds requires determining the truth-values of the
conjuncts therein. So the problem remains.
It seems to be a condition on the possibility of theorists knowing what
truth is that they already be in possession of a working concept of truth-
values, which presumably includes being in possession of a minimal concept
TRUTH. An eighth attempt at dissolution takes aim at that claim: surely, it’s
possible to possess a minimal concept of x without knowing anything more
substantial about what x is a concept of. For example, one can possess the
concept WATER, or the concept SUGAR, without being able to determine what
water, or sugar, consists in. In particular, one need not know in advance or
be able to determine that samples of water are samples of H2O, H3O,
deionized, etc., or that samples of sugar are samples of C12H22O11,
C6H12O6, C5H10O5, etc., in order to apply WATER to water, or SUGAR to
sugar. Rather, someone possesses the concept WATER only if they can, e.g.,
discriminate amongst samples of water from non-water, recognize this
sample of water as being qualitatively similar to that sample of water, etc.
Analogously, one can possess the concept TRUTH without knowing in
advance what realizes the role of truth: ‘it is unsurprising’, wrote Lynch, that
we are familiar and adept with the job of truth ‘while remaining clueless
about its nature’ [2005: 29]. Therefore, goes the objection, the problem of
epistemic circularity rears only because of a faulty premise involving
referential opacity.13
Concepts are simply mental representations of categories: a concept FENCE
is a mental representation of fences; TELEPHONE is a mental representation of
hand-held devices used for distal communication; etc. So, being in
possession of a concept x involves being able to mentally represent a
category of xs. But nothing about the problem of epistemic circularity
requires denying that knowledge of x can be prised apart from knowledge of
the deeper metaphysical features within which membership in the category
of xs consists. Hence, the objection is based on a misunderstanding about
the very problem of epistemic circularity. There are two individually
necessary and jointly sufficient claims that must be, and have been,
established in order to show why the problem is a problem for theories of
truth. One must establish that theorists using Ramsification must
13Thanks to Michael Horton for pressing this objection.
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determine—in whatever epistemic sense anyone wants to help themselves
to—that all conjuncts of R are true. Then, one must establish that so
determining involves, e.g., already possessing the concept TRUTH, or
knowing in advance what truth is. Again, we assume that functionalists
and other truth-theorists have some minimal sense of what they are
(literally) talking about; were that not the case, the process of amassing the
principles constitutive of T could never have begun. Yet, it hardly follows
from the claim that theorists need to know in advance what truth is that they
need to know in advance what truth consists in (i.e., what its nature is, what
its realizers are, whether it is reductively analysable as weak homomorphism
for a given sector of discourse, etc.).
Lastly, one might point out that sentences derived by Ramsification may
be acceptable for establishing implicit definitions even if the truth-values of
some conjuncts of R cannot be determined, or else are determined to be
gappy or even just plain false. This point is correct as far as it goes,
though it goes against nothing I’ve argued. Lewis [1970: 432] put the point
by remarking that unique near-realization might be unique realization near
enough: if some n-tuple uniquely near-realizes T 0, then we may be able to
correct or slightly modify T 0 such that the n-tuple uniquely realizes its
successor T 00. Bedard [1993: 504–5; see also e.g., Field 1973; Hawthorne
1994] further noted that the t-names from a nearly-realized or even
unrealized theory partially denote, to varying degrees, each of the n-tuples
that are fully denoted according to the uniquely realized subtheories of T .
Yet, we cannot apply these or other suppositions to the case of truth
without thereby playing a shell game; for the problem of epistemic
circularity’s dogging functionalism will merely arise for the successor T 00
instead, or for the subtheories of T 0.14 Specifically, we might suppose, with
Lynch [2004: 405–6], that implicit definition of t-terms tolerates a great
deal of permutation in the constituents of T so long as there is some
essential core or weighted subset—the so-called minimal core of the F-role.
Yet, this relaxation from all conjuncts of R to some weighted subset R0
raises the twin questions of which conjuncts are incontrovertible and
why.15 In answering ‘all the true ones’, we go around in yet another very
small circle. And like-minded answers don’t dissolve the problem so much
as just repackage it: R0 is a smaller sentence with a greater probability of
success, but the truth of its conjuncts must still be secured if the definition
is to be successful.
6. A Putative Solution
The problem of epistemic circularity calls for positive solutions, not
negative dissolutions. I now turn to one, which begins with the following
14Pace Field [1973], the inability to determine that all conjuncts of R are true merely leaves the t-terminology
referentially indeterminate, in which case the definiendum may partially denote more than one thing.
Presumably, pluralism about truth is consistent with such results.
15The questions are made even thornier to the extent that error theories, which suggest T-schema instances
are false, are plausible. (Ironically, some advocates of error theories have employed functionalism about
truth e.g., Devlin [2003], to support their view.)
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reminder. Knowledge of what the t-term true refers to is not
common knowledge, ex hypothesi, given what it means for a term to
be a t-term. Consequently, it would be a mistake to treat the
functionalist’s thesis,
(fnct) true refers to the single higher-order functional role property F of
having lower-order properties r1, . . . , rn that realize it,
as a description of common knowledge—a claim that’s also supported by
the sole empirical study on the matter [Næss 1938]. And so, it stands to
reason that the expression of what is common knowledge needn’t—indeed,
shouldn’t—be the very same t-term under analysis.
As a solution to the problem of epistemic circularity, this proposal is
satisfied easily. The truth-theorist need only invoke some o-term, say *true,
that expresses the ordinary street-level concept, *TRUTH, where the latter is
the mental representation of some category structured by the property
*truth. In doing so, she can show that her employment of Ramsification
merely involves an implicit commitment to the *truth of all conjuncts of R.
Any further evaluation of the conjuncts of R merely involves explicit
decisions that they are *true, relative to how the world is. And such
decisions rest simply on one’s basic linguistic competence with the o-terms
and o-sentences of L. Problem solved.
This positive solution has several happy consequences. First, it accords
well with many functionalists’ specific emphasis on common knowledge
and our folk understanding [Lynch 2000, 2004, 2005]. It also accords well
with the general motivation to use Ramsification; for the point was always
to use old, ordinary, and original terms against which the t-terms
inaugurated by a theory can be holistically situated. And it also vindicates
functionalists’ use of Ramsification as, again, something more than a
gratuitous logical drill. Under this solution, Ramsification proceeds in the
usual way. Interdefinable t-terms are replaced with existentially bound
variables; and since *true is an o-term, no variable need replace it.
Presumably then—or, at least, under the canonical Lewisian version—
semantic circularity is avoided. And no epistemic circularity ensues since
alethic theorists implicitly define true by explicitly helping themselves to
the property referred to, and concept expressed, by *true. Best of all,
Ramsification itself is not needed to define o-terms like *true that issue
from a commonsense conception or street-level vocabulary, since
Ramsification is not needed to define o-terms.
One consequence, however, may seem less happy. This solution requires
of functionalists that they give up or otherwise tread on their monist
assumptions. Why? Because appealing to the property *truth to evaluate
each conjunct of R, such that Ramsification can be used to implicitly define
a technical or specialized t-term true that refers to a single domain-general
higher-order multiply-realizable functional role property F, involves
proliferating properties in exactly the way that functionalists meant to
avoid. Call this the pluralist’s revenge.
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7. Remarks on the Pluralist’s Revenge
7.1 Initial Objections Addressed
Some questions and objections can be immediately dispensed with. For
instance, isn’t pluralism about truth defective, given that, pace Lewis,
unique realization is the standard of correctness to insist on? Not
necessarily. If T is a version of pluralism about truth, then presumably
we’d count it as being true only if more than one ordered n-tuple of entities
satisfies its realization formula, and false otherwise. So unique realization is
precisely the wrong standard to insist on for such a theory, and we
ought not to treat pluralism, if true, as defective simply for describing
what, in that case, is the case. Either way, whether pluralists have a viable
position themselves is an open question that’s in little need of being settled
here.
Other questions arise for which no simple or definitive answer is available.
For example, what features do *truth and *truth have, and are those
features really sufficient to do the work asked of them? Here, the best one
can do is to note several constraints that would need to be satisfied for the
solution to be viable, and to argue that *truth and *truth have the features
that do satisfy these constraints. For instance, one constraint is that *true
and true must be referential without being co-referential; another is that
their referents should be a species of accuracy or correctness (rather than
legitimacy, authenticity, fidelity, etc.). Prima facie, we have no reason to
suppose that such constraints aren’t satisfied, and that’s reason enough for
supposing that they are. But ultimately, whether *true is a species of
accuracy or correctness but not co-referential with true depends, in part, on
how speakers of L use the o-term *true. And that’s simply an empirical
matter for the lexicographer.
Other questions and objections, however, cannot be addressed obliquely.
For example, suppose functionalists complain that the predicate is *true was
introduced stipulatively as a ‘designer’ predicate—i.e., one introduced by
design solely to solve the problem of epistemic circularity. It’s unclear why
anyone should accept that *true was introduced stipulatively—ex hypothesi,
it was not. But, even allowing that it was, the complaint nevertheless
confuses the introduction of *true stipulatively as an o-term, which entails
only that it has achieved unit status in the grammar of L prior to the
formulation of T , with the introduction of it stipulatively into the grammar
of L. So, if *true was introduced stipulatively, then it was introduced
stipulatively as an o-term, and so the complaint couldn’t be that it isn’t,
though it could be revised to be that *true cannot possibly be an o-term, and
so cannot be stipulatively introduced as one.
The revised complaint would be reasonable if there were evidence for
thinking either, first, that *true has achieved unit status in the grammar of L
but not prior to the formulation of T , or else, secondly that *true just hasn’t
achieved unit status simpliciter. In neither case do we need to pass the issue
off as an empirical question for the lexicographer. The first thought
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presupposes that *true is indeed a term expressing the corresponding street-
level alethic concept possessed by ordinary folk, and it’d be absurd to
suppose that such folk only expressed themselves thus following the
formulation of functionalism about truth. But if we take *true to express the
corresponding street-level alethic concept possessed by ordinary folk, then
the only warrant for the second thought that it hasn’t achieved unitization
would be that ‘*true’ is nowhere apparent in spoken or written discourse.
And this belies a fundamental confusion about the notation ‘*’. Neither the
solution nor the pluralist’s revenge entails the claim that ordinary folk mark
the expression of their street-level alethic concept differently than truth-
theorists’ use of true. Quite the contrary; it’s precisely because the
phonological or orthographic representation of the o- and t-terms do
converge—e.g., [troo] and [true], respectively, in English—despite the fact
that the semantic representations diverge, that there’s need, here, for some
diacritic or other convention to distinguish the o-term that ordinary folk do
use from the functionalists’ technical term true.
7.2 A Deeper Challenge
Both the solution and the pluralist’s revenge raise an important series of
questions about the relationships (e.g., hyponymy, polysemy, homonymy)
between technical terms introduced by theories of truth and their lay
counterparts. The proposal thus far has been that, for any given theory of
truth T , terms like truth and true are its theoretical terms (what else could
they be?), and that, as an o-term, *true is pre-theoretical in the
straightforwardly literal sense that it has unit status in the grammar of L
prior to the formulation of T . As an o-term, *true may also occur in (T :
P1, . . . , Pn), though it need not—nothing about Ramsification requires that
all o-terms be included in (T : P1, . . . , Pn), just as nothing about
Ramsification requires that the articulation of any given theory includes a
dictionary. On the other hand, truth must occur in (T : P1, . . . , Pn), since it’s
the target t-name replaced by a variable in deriving T 0 or any successor
formula.
One interesting manoeuvre might be for functionalists to argue that it’s a
mistake to think *true is always and everywhere an o-term. Unitization in
the grammar of L prior to the formulation of T doesn’t rule out that *true is
an o-term relative to T but a t-term relative to the formulation of some
earlier theory S. According to Lynch [2004, 2005], speakers of L do possess
just such a universal folk theory of truth S, whose principles (O1, . . . , On)
express the ordinary alethic concepts that give rise to L and its
metalinguistic extension. In particular, *true is a t-term issuing from this
universal folk theory, in which case—goes the objection—functionalists’
implicit definition of true merely captures that folk-theoretical use
metatheoretically.
This manoeuvre aims to help functionalists maintain their monistic
assumptions by showing that there’s exactly one truth property. Its success
depends on functionalists’ being able to show that the principles fixing their
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t-term true and folk theorists’ t-term *true turn out to be the same or
substantially overlapping—i.e., the conjecture that T ffi S. After all, only in
that case could the two properties referred to by true and *true be
reductively identified, and only with such an identification would it have
been shown both that there’s exactly one truth property and thus that the
pluralist’s revenge is avoided.
A litany of problems accompanies any such reductive identification,
however. At best, this manoeuvre is only partially successful; for even if
*true is indeed an o-term relative to (T : P1, . . . , Pn) but a t-term relative to
(S: O1, . . . , On), both the solution and the pluralist’s revenge remain
unaddressed in the case where *true is an o-term relative to T . And where
*true is a t-term relative to S, the manoeuvre may not even be partially
successful; for if implicit definition by Ramsification over (S: O1, . . . , On) is
needed, the problem of epistemic circularity would simply reoccur. The
potential for regress ought to be avoided where possible.
The problems worsen. Even if a reductive identification were fully
successful, the problem of epistemic circularity would then just be
reinstated; for the solution depends on there being some numerically
distinct property *truth had by all conjuncts of R, such that it’s sufficient for
defining the t-term true that the theorist determine the *true sentences in
which it features as a subsentential component. Moreover, any such
reductive identification would also seem to be self-abdicating; for it would
entail that the functionalist’s property truth just is the good old-fashioned
property referred to by ordinary folk. But in that case, it’s unclear why
anyone would ever need a functionalist theory of truth employing
Ramsification to implicitly define it as such in the first place.16
Clearing these obstacles brings us to the deeper issue of whether the
conjecture T ffi S is gripping, and, if so, then to what extent their principles
overlap. There’s reason to suspect substantial differences. First, it’s quite
clear that functionalism about truth is a technical philosophical theory T ,
along the lines of (infl), about a specific functional kind F to which truth
purportedly reduces. In the context of such a theory, the t-name truth is
introduced to denote it. In the context of a substantially different
philosophical theory—e.g., a correspondence theory postulating a two-
place structural relation to ‘Cambridge’ facts—it’s also clear that implicit
definition will yield a different meaning and denotation, since, obviously, the
theoretical principles of functionalist and structuralist theories differ
substantially. And the substantially different theoretical principles of either
of these technical theories will differ substantially from those of the
universal folk theory S. Functionalists themselves have made this latter
claim a central part of their view:
[T]he principles we employ in our folk theory are those the folk tacitly believe,
or are rationally committed to. They aren’t those principles that result from
technical philosophical argument: thus principles that concern the nature of
16Also unclear would be how to uphold the very distinction between what Carnap and Lewis called the
analytic versus synthetic postulate of T (i.e., t- and o-sentences, respectively) if o-terms and t-terms are
sometimes co-referential, synonymous, or otherwise interdefinable.
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correspondence, reference, coherence, superassertibility, and the like are not
part of our folk theory.
[Lynch 2004: 393 n. 6]
Conversely, the folk-theoretic platitudes or truisms of S typically don’t
appear in technical philosophical theories T 1, . . . , T n, and typically don’t do
any heavy lifting if and when they do, as Chomsky observed:17
A good part of contemporary philosophy of language is concerned with
analyzing alleged relations between expressions and things, often exploring
intuitions about the technical [terms] denote, refer, true of, etc. said to hold
between expressions and something else. But there can be no intuitions about
these [terms], just as there can be none about angular velocity or protein. These
are technical terms of philosophical discourse with a stipulated sense that has
no counterpart in ordinary language.
[2000: 130; cf. Næss 1938]
But now notice that if Lynch and Chomsky are correct about the distinction
between technical philosophical theories and non-technical folk theories,
then making good on the claim that true and *true are co-referential would
require ignoring non-trivial and possibly vast differences between (T :
P1, . . . , Pn) and (S: O1, . . . , On).
In the absence of a bijective function mapping functionalists’ principles
(T : P1, . . . , Pn) into S, then we have numerically distinct conjunctions,
and thus numerically distinct truth-conditions, associated with each
postulate; and the upshot is the positing of numerically distinct, even if
only partially denoted, n-tuples. After all, recall that the cardinality of the
extension of truth is determined by the number of unique functional
specifications, where each unique functional specification implicitly defines
a distinct t-term. Functionalists about truth must therefore take care to
not proliferate functional specifications. Yet, functional specifications are
easy to proliferate—formally speaking, one need only begin altering the
identity- and truth-conditions of the content constituting them [Wright
2005]. Of course, as Lynch rightly pointed out, ‘slight differences in
[content] do not entail that we are simply talking past one another’
[Lynch 2005: 39]. We needn’t disagree with that point, however, since the
relevant differences under consideration between alethic theorists and
ordinary folk were never the slight ones to begin with; rather, they are
increasingly tending towards a yawning conceptual gap. In any case,
suffice it to say that there are sobering difficulties with functionalists’
showing that pluralists are wrong to proliferate truth properties, as there
17Lynch, Horwich, and others often take the principles of a theory of truth (T : P1, . . . , Pn) to be platitudes,
where platitude picks out those claims that, inter alia, reflect the ordinary uses of terms in a given linguistic
community. Yet, t-terms have no such ordinary uses for platitudes to reflect, ex hypothesi. Therefore, t-terms
do not occur in platitudes. Platitude-talk therefore seems to instigate a dilemma. If platitudes are the
constituents of T and true is a t-term, then true cannot occur in T and so cannot be implicitly defined by
Ramsification over it. But then, the only terms whose ordinary uses could be reflected by platitudes are o-
terms; and so if true is instead an o-term, then it can occur in T . But then Ramsification would again become
superfluous, since Ramsification is unnecessary for defining o-terms.
282 Cory D. Wright
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
B
y
:
 
[
C
a
l
i
f
o
r
n
i
a
 
S
t
a
t
e
 
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
L
o
n
g
 
B
e
a
c
h
]
 
A
t
:
 
1
7
:
1
6
 
2
 
J
u
n
e
 
2
0
1
0
are non-trivial difficulties in identifying and individuating the F-role
monistically.18
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